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On 1 1 November 1 9 1 8 , the day the armistice ending the 'war to end all 
wars ' was signed, Sir Robert Borden confided to his diary: T h e wor ld 
has drifted far from its o ld anchorage and no man can with certainty 
prophesy what the outcome wil l be. I have said that another such war 
would destroy our civilisation. It is a grave question whether this war 
may not have destroyed much that w e regard as necessarily incident 
thereto.' 1 The Canadian pr ime minister was right. The Great War had 
destroyed much that was taken for granted, and in the ensuing decade 
the powers made var ious attempts to come to terms with the changes 
wrought by that t remendous conflict and to prevent another upheava l . 2 
For the three members of the North Atlantic triangle the ten years after 
the war was a period of transition. The spirit of war t ime cooperation 
was not carried into the complicated, acrimonious, and often confusing 
atmosphere marked, above all, by growing rivalry and even hostility in 
Anglo-American relations. This r ivalry was to a remarkable degree 
reflected in Canada . A s Canadian leaders pursued their desire for 
increased autonomy and insulation from international problems, they 
often found themselves caught between the two senior partners. In the 
process of avoiding entanglement in Anglo-Amer ican and European 
squabbles, Canada often s ided with the United States, and it began to 
reorient its economic, political, and intellectual focus a w a y from Britain. 
Canada 's interwar wi thd rawa l from Imperial and international commit­
ments and concomitant preoccupation with North American affairs 
mirrored a more lasting reconfiguration of the North Atlantic triangle: 
the general shift in p o w e r a w a y from Britain and towards the United 
States. 3 
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PERSONALITIES A N D POLICIES 
Although foreign policy is often the product of the complex interplay 
between domestic politics and international developments - or, as some 
would have it, 'structural determinants ' 4 - it is still shaped and influ­
enced by people. It is therefore important to understand in broad terms 
some of the attitudes and approaches of those w h o shaped foreign pol­
icy within the North Atlantic triangle during the 1920s. For most of the 
war and the early pos twar period American policy was in the hands of 
Woodrow Wilson, Democratic president from 1 9 1 3 to 1 9 2 1 . Wilson's 
basic aim was to create what has often been referred to as a l ibera l inter­
nationalist' wor ld order based on the concepts of freer trade, open diplo­
macy, and national self-determination. A l l of these aims were embodied 
in the League of Nations organization created at the end of the Great 
War. For various reasons, about which historians still d isagree , 5 the 
Wilsonian vision w a s rejected by the U.S. Senate and this defeat 
paved the w a y for the so-called Republican Ascendancy during the 
1920s . 6 
That ascendancy began with the election of Warren Harding in 1920 
and continued under the administrations of Calv in Cool idge and then 
Herbert Hoover, w h o served from 1928 until his defeat by Franklin 
Roosevelt and the Democrats in 1 9 3 2 . For much of this period the presi­
dent did not exercise as much control over foreign policy as other mem­
bers of the cabinet, most notably Charles Evans Hughes , secretary of 
state under Harding and Coolidge; A n d r e w Mellon, w h o served as Trea­
sury secretary under all three Republican presidents; and Herbert 
Hoover, w h o exerted a powerful influence at Commerce until assuming 
office. Traditionally, historians have v iewed the Republican era as the 
American retreat into political isolationism.7 The rejection of Wilson's 
internationalist approach taught Republican leaders to pay more atten­
tion to domestic opinion, especially as it was reflected in the Senate, and 
to shape policy accordingly. Hence, Amer ican leaders turned inward. 
While it is true that the United States did not join the League of Nations 
and generally wi thdrew politically from international affairs, the country 
was far from detached. 8 After all, it participated in three major disarma­
ment conferences, co-sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact out lawing war , 
and, through the D a w e s and Young plans, lent its efforts to ease eco­
nomic and financial problems in Europe. These forays into international 
diplomacy represented two significant aims in Amer ican foreign policy: 
promoting peace through European and American economic well-being 
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and preventing the United States from being d rawn into another major 
European war . 
In the light of those general aims, other American goals seem some­
what contradictory. The United States sought to expand economically 
and pursued naval equality, if not superiority, over Great Britain. ' Amer­
ican economic expansion has given rise to suspicions that policy was 
being directed by the business elite. '" The reality was not that s imple ." 
The State Department, for example, often disagreed with Commerce, and 
various bodies in the United States stood against the 'big naval ' lobby in 
Washington. Thus, although the predominant tendency of the United 
States was to tum inward politically and avoid international commit­
ments whi le seeking to increase economic and military power, there was 
a fisstparous quality to American foreign policy that led to certain mis-
perceptions about the direction in which the United States was moving. 
This misunderstanding was particularly true in Great Bri ta in ." 
Six governments held power in Britain during the postwar decade. 
David Lloyd George headed a coalition that governed from 1 9 1 6 until 
his resignation in 1922 . Britain then went through three general elec­
tions in less than two vears (November 1922 ; December 1923; October 
1924). The 1 9 2 2 election produced a Conservat ive government led by 
Canadian-born A n d r e w Bonar Law until his death from cancer in 1 9 2 3 , 
and then by Stanley Baldwin. Ramsay MacDonald led the first-ever 
Labour government for nine short months following the 1923 election, 
after which Baldwin returned to win the 1924 election; he governed until 
MacDonald and his Labour party regained control in 1929. Like the situ­
ation in the United States, there was a considerable division of opinion 
within Britain over the direction of postwar foreign policy. Old-style 
nationalists, such as Law, and foreign secretaries, such as the Marquess 
of Curzon ( 1 9 1 9 - 2 3 ) and Austen Chamberlain (1924-29) , were contemp­
tuous of the United States and v iewed American intrusion into British 
spheres of influence with suspicion. Another group, often referred to as 
'AtLanticists,' which included the lord president of the council, Lord 
Balfour, and, off and on, Winston Church i l l 1 ' sought cooperation and 
understanding with the United States. Other groupings included vari­
ous politicians, bureaucrats, or intellectuals, such as Colonial and 
Dominions Secretary Leo Amery , Maurice Hankey, the 'man of secrets' 
w h o served as secretary of the cabinet and the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, British statesman Lord Robert Cecil, and Montagu Norman, 
governor of the Bank of England. These people wished either to trans­
form the British Empire or to pursue the search for what D C Watt has 
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termed 'a possible Amer ica / meaning an America that wou ld fit in wi th 
Britain's image of the w o r l d . 1 4 
The divisions aside, the British sought to achieve two basic aims dur­
ing the 1920s. One was to preserve the European balance of power ; the 
other was to maintain and defend the empire. For much of the pos twar 
decade Britain concentrated on European affairs, particularly on the 
need to satisfy France's demand for security against a resurgent Ger­
many in the aftermath of the Amer ican refusal to join the League of 
Nations. This is not to say that Britain neglected its empire. A s a l w a y s , 
British strength lay in the continued existence of a unified empire; but in 
seeking to fulfil this goal the British frequently locked horns wi th the 
autonomy-minded Canadians. 
If the 1920s were years of the Republican ascendancy in the United 
States and largely Conservat ive domination in Britain, in Canada they 
marked the beginning of the Liberal ascendancy. 1 5 The Conservat ives , 
led by Robert Borden - Sir Robert after 1 9 1 4 - had been in power since 
1 9 1 1 . The 1 9 1 7 federal election produced a Union government headed 
by Borden. After ill health forced Borden to retire in 1920, Arthur 
Meighen led the party until his defeat at the hands of Will iam L y o n 
Mackenzie King and the Liberals in 1 9 2 1 . Except for a brief hiatus in 
1926, King dominated Canadian politics and foreign policy throughout 
the 1920s - in fact, excepting the period from 1930 to 1 9 3 5 , he dominated 
Canadian policy from 1 9 2 1 to 1 9 4 8 . 1 6 Emphasizing the role of the pr ime 
minister in the making of Canadian foreign policy - or 'external affairs' 
in the Canadian lexicon - is no mistake. From 1 9 1 2 to 1946 all Canadian 
prime minsters served as their o w n secretary of state for external affairs. 
Of course there we re others w h o influenced the direction of foreign pol­
icy: for example, Newton Rowel l , a Liberal politician w h o joined Bor­
den's Union government and whose interest in Canada 's international 
position almost exceeded that of the pr ime minister. Under King there 
were a number of notable personalities, including Ernest Lapointe, 
the French-Canadian justice minister, w h o supported the League of 
Nations, and J .L. Ralston, the minister of national defence. Others w h o 
deserve mention are Walter Hose, the director of the Canadian N a v a l 
Services, whose contribution and influence has been only recently recog­
nized; 1 7 J .S. Ewart , a l awyer and constitutional expert w h o acted as an 
unofficial adviser to King during the 1920s; and J.W. Dafoe, the editor of 
what used to be the best newspaper in Canada , the Manitoba Free Press. 
But the most remarkable protagonists were Loring Christie and O.D. 
Skelton of the Department of External Af fa i r s . 1 8 
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Christie cuts a fascinating and rather tragic figure in Canadian his­
tory. He served as legal adviser under Borden and Meighen and, though 
he bel ieved that Canada wou ld eventually have to assume control over 
foreign policy, he shared Borden's notion of an imperial federation in 
which the dominions wou ld have a say in the formulation of empire 
pol icy . ' 9 This idea did not endear him to King and he was eased out in 
1923 . (He returned in 1 9 3 5 a confirmed anti-imperial isolationist.) 
Christie 's place as a key adviser w a s taken by Skelton, a former univer­
sity professor, w h o became under-secretary of state for external affairs 
in 1925 and King ' s most trusted adviser. Skelton was anti-imperialist 
and neutralist - if not isolationist - from the start, and he fought hard 
for Canadian independence throughout his career . 2 0 Al though Borden, 
Meighen, and King - and Christie and Skelton - m a y have differed over 
means, they shared a common goal: the advancement of Canadian 
autonomy, the promotion of good Anglo-American relations, and grow­
ing disenchantment with the League of Nations. Borden and Meighen 
paid a great deal of lip service to the empire, but it w a s initially under 
their policies, not King ' s , that Canada began to m o v e a w a y from Britain 
and towards the United States. 2 1 King certainly carried the fight through 
the 1920s and beyond. Under his leadership Canadians became used to 
hearing the slogans 'no commitments ' and 'Parliament wil l decide' as 
the country began to wi thdraw from European and imperial commit­
ments. 
Within the North Atlantic triangle, then, there were three broad cur­
rents. One was the gradual Canadian and American wi thdrawal from 
international commitments. The second was American economic expan­
sion and its effect on Canadian-American and Anglo-Amer ican rela­
tions. The third w a s the g rowing Anglo-Amer ican naval r ivalry and its 
impact on Canada ' s position in the triangle. These developments did not 
happen overnight; rather, there was a s low evolut ionary change that 
resulted from separate responses to the new international and domestic 
conditions each member of the triangle faced after the Great War. 
THE PEACE AND THE LEAGUE 
Perhaps even more than its triangle allies, Canadian attitudes towards 
the pos twar era we re moulded by the charnel house of the Great War 
which had maimed and slaughtered the f lower of Canadian youth. 'It 
was European policy, European statesmanship, European ambition, that 
drenched this wor ld in blood and from which w e are still suffering and 
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wil l suffer for generations/ charged the Canadian delegate, Newton 
Rowell , at the inaugural gathering of the League of Nations in 1920. 
'Fifty thousand Canadians under the soil of France and Flanders is what 
Canada has pa id for European statesmanship trying to settle Euro­
pean problems . ' 2 2 Four years later another Canadian representative at 
Geneva, Senator Raoul Dandurand, spoke for an entire nation baptised 
by fire when he declared: ' w e think in terms of peace, whi le Europe, an 
armed camp, thinks in terms of w a r ... W e live in a fire-proof house, far 
from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from E u r o p e . ' 2 3 
To many Canadians, the nascent League of Nations - the brainchild of 
President W o o d r o w Wilson - symbolized a perilous affiliation. Canada 
had successfully lobbied at the Paris Peace Conference of 1 9 1 9 to join the 
wor ld body as a separate member. Yet this campaign had been based 
more on the ambition to see the dominion's status and voice as an auton­
omous nation acknowledged than on any heartfelt belief in the princi­
ples of collective securi ty . 2 4 From the point of v i e w of most Canadians 
the League w a s s imply an instrument for European nations to manipu­
late in resolving private quarrels that in no w a y touched Canada. Clif­
ford Sifton, the proprietor of the Manitoba Free Press and a former cabinet 
minister, w a r n e d that Canada ' s continued membership w o u l d 'do us no 
good and may possibly get us into trouble.' Sifton spoke for many Cana­
dians when he asserted that the main aim of the 'people over there' was 
to ensnare Canadians in 'European and Imperialistic complicat ions. ' 2 5 
Small wonder that successive Canadian governments strove first to 
delete and, w h e n that failed, to amend substantially Article X of the 
League Covenant. This article, which Wilson termed 'the heart of the 
Covenant / p ledged member states to come to the aid of any one of them 
w h o w a s the victim of an act of aggression. It w a s not a concept that 
appealed to many Canadians, including Prime Minister Borden, whose 
opposition carried an almost hysterical tone. Inclusion of the article, he 
said, 'might lead to great disorder, possibly rebellion on the Pacific 
Coast of the United States and C a n a d a . ' 2 6 Instead, the League must be 
regarded solely as a body that furnished the means to mediate, arbitrate, 
and adjudicate disputes. Christie argued that Canada should w o r k 
towards 'a League that is a method of diplomacy and is not an institution 
with fighting compacts . ' 2 7 The message here w a s clear. The League 
should provide a forum for the discussion and debate of wor ld affairs, 
but it should do little more. Indeed, argued many Canadians , Canada 
ought to abandon the League if it remained pr imari ly fixated on Euro­
pean matters. The dominion should a lways approach its 'obligations 
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and interventions in regard to all regions of the earth in a sense compat­
ible with her geographical posi t ion. ' 2 8 
Projects designed to enlarge and fortify the collective security aspects 
of the League Covenant , such as the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Set­
tlement of International Disputes - which called for compulsory arbitra­
tion and military or economic sanctions against aggressor states - had to 
be avoided at all costs. According to O.D. Skelton, Canada w a s a country 
'fortunate in its comparat ive isolation and its friendly neighbour. ' It had 
nothing in common with European nations, 'heirs to centuries of feuds 
and fears . ' 2 9 The Locarno Pact of 1925 was no better. By the terms of this 
treaty, France, Belgium, and Germany pledged to respect each other's 
borders and Britain and Italy guaranteed the arrangement. The renunci­
ation by Germany and France of any wish to alter their existing bound­
aries, coupled with an agreement to arbitrate disputes between them, 
were certainly 'steps toward peace,' Skelton conceded, 'but they are 
Europe 's steps, Europe 's job and should rest for their enforcement upon 
the conduct of France and Germany, not upon intervention by a country 
four thousand miles away . ' A Canadian endorsement of Locarno would 
pose too grave a risk to the dominion, particularly g iven its racial com­
position, its proximity to the United States, and its millstone of war 
debt . 3 0 
A l l in all, the prevail ing sentiment in Canada during the 1920s 
demanded that every effort be geared towards ensuring that Canadians 
would not again be made 'catspaws of European imper ia l ism. ' 3 1 Calam­
ity wou ld definitely ensue through any connection with the ' legacy of 
warfare hate & bloodshed which makes Europe a shambles . ' 3 2 A Liberal 
MP, Chubby Power , anticipated this mood, which would grip much of 
the country in the 1920s, in a speech to the House of Commons in Sep­
tember 1 9 1 9 : 
We as Canadians have our destiny before us not in Continental Europe but here 
on the free soil of America. Our policy for the next hundred years should be that 
laid down by George Washington in the United States for the guidance of his 
country-men - absolute renunciation of interference in European affairs - and 
that laid down by the other great father of his country in Canada, Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier - 'freedom from the vortex of European militarism' ... let Europe be the 
arbiter of its own destiny while we in Canada, turning our energies to our own 
affairs, undertake our own peaceful development.3 3 
That a Canadian should invoke the spirit of one of the founding fathers 
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of the United States to argue the case for his o w n country's non-
interventionism w a s no coincidence; for during the pos twar decade 
many Americans we re making strikingly similar arguments about the 
need to evade military and political commitments abroad. 
Isolationist sentiment in the United States during the 1920s had many 
standard-bearers but its main leadership undoubtedly came from the 
American Senate . 3 4 It was a point of v i e w first articulated in the battle 
waged there in 1 9 1 8 - 2 0 to prevent the country from joining the League 
of Nations. There were several arguments advanced against member­
ship that were unique to Amer ican sensibilities, 3 5 but certain of their 
essentials closely resembled Canadian attitudes. The League of Nations 
was 'nothing but a mind cure' and a 'pipe dream, ' suggested Senator 
Frank Brandegee . 3 6 Moreover , as far as the United States w a s concerned, 
Idaho's William Borah firmly believed, it wou ld 'finally lead us all into 
all kinds of entangling obligations and conditions with European 
affairs. ' 3 7 Article X w o u l d see to that. Underwri t ing the territorial integ­
rity of every nation which comprised the League w a s 'a ve ry g rave , a 
very perilous promise to make, ' warned Wilson's bitter enemy and 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Henry Cabot 
Lodge: 'because there is but one w a y by which such guarantees, if ever 
invoked, can be maintained, and that w a y is the w a y of force ... If w e 
guarantee any country on earth ... that guarantee w e must maintain at 
any cost when our w o r d is once given, and w e must be in constant pos­
session of fleets and armies capable of enforcing these guarantees at a 
moment's not ice. ' 3 8 In the end, the Treaty of Versailles, along with the 
League of Nations, w a s rejected by the United States Senate in March 
1920. However , that body ' s isolationist vanguard remained ever vigilant 
for any other initiative that might similarly sacrifice their country's 
peace, prosperity, and independence on the altar of European or As ian 
ambitions and rivalries. A n inviting target soon appeared in the form of 
the Four Power Pact, one of the agreements arising out of the Washing­
ton Conference on nava l arms limitation of 1 9 2 1 - 2 . The United States, 
Britain, Japan, and France agreed to respect each other's territorial rights 
in the Pacific, to refer disputes between them to a conference of all four 
nations, and to consult one another in the event of an outside attack 
against them. 3 9 
For Senate isolationists the treaty w a s an armed alliance pure and sim­
ple through which the United States incurred dangerous obligations. It 
flew in the face of traditional American foreign policy, injected the 
republic into foreign squabbles unconnected with its o w n interests, and 
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threatened its sovereignty in diplomatic affairs. Worst of all, it wou ld 
one day drag the country into a w a r . 4 0 Senate opponents attacked the 
pact as a 'menacing little imitation league, ' another example of 'the old 
hellish system whose frightful story is told upon a thousand battlefields 
of the Old World. ' If it were ratified, 'American boys [would] again shed 
their blood on foreign f ie lds . ' 4 1 The Senate eventually passed the treaty, 
but not before its isolationist members succeeded in neutering it by 
attaching a reservation to Amer ican adherence that excluded any com­
mitment to armed force, an alliance, or the obligation to assist in defence 
against aggress ion . 4 2 The Senate also operated against other foreign pol­
icy initiatives such as Amer ican membership in the World Court. The 
Senate approved American membership in the court in 1926, but only 
after affixing several reservat ions. 4 3 Three years later isolationist Sena­
tors were similarly able to protect America 's freedom of action and limit 
its international obligations by so qualifying the country's adhesion to 
the KeEogg-Briand Pact - which renounced w a r as an instrument of 
national policy - that it amounted to nothing more than 'an international 
k i s s . ' 4 4 
One belief in particular underlay and unified American isolationist 
attitudes dur ing the 1920s: that the decision of the United States to enter 
the Great War in 1 9 1 7 had been a mistake. This v i ew sprang from post­
war histories of the origins of the conflict by both European and Amer i ­
can writers that marshalled impressive evidence to support the thesis 
that not only had the Germans not been completely villainous or the 
Allies completely altruistic, but that perhaps the All ies rather than the 
Central Powers were primarily culpable for the war . American revision­
ist historians condemned their country's intervention in the conflict on 
that basis in the hope that the same error would not be made aga in . 4 5 
Why, then, had the United States participated at all, if one side had been 
no more virtuous than the other, unless it had been duped? Al l the 
moral and selfless reasons for American intervention seemed to be 
stripped bare. The revisionist interpretation w a s fuelled by the convic­
tion that the entire peace settlement was founded on a misconception, 
since it formally assigned Germany special responsibility for the con­
flict. In fact, there was much that American isolationists considered 
iniquitous about the Treaty of Versailles. In many w a y s , when it came to 
both the war-guilt question and the criticism of Versailles, they took 
their cue from European, and particularly British, opinion. 4 6 
Indeed, the ' thesaurus' of Amer ican isolationists was British econo­
mist John Maynard Keynes ' s The Economic Consequences of the Peace, pub-
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lished at the end of 1 9 1 9 . In a scathing critique, Keynes denounced the 
Versailles settlement as excessively severe towards Germany. He argued 
that its draconian reparations arrangements represented the triumph of 
political retribution over fiscal common sense. Rather than laying a solid 
foundation for peace, the treaty sowed the seeds of another w a r . 4 7 It 
was , Keynes reproached, 'one of the most outrageous acts of a cruel vic­
tor in civilised history' and wou ld be the 'death sentence of many mil­
lions of German men, women and chi ldren. ' 4 8 The impact of Keynes ' s 
study of the peace conference w a s w idesp read . 4 9 It was also immense, 
no more so than in his native Britain, where it soon became the rarely 
challenged v iew of the majority. 'AH the phrases of the 1920 ' s , ' Martin 
Gilbert has observed, 'peaceful change, treaty revision, bringing Ger­
many back to her rightful place in Europe, obtaining equality for the 
former foe, appeasement, ' could be traced to K e y n e s . 5 0 Even though 
Britain's geopolitical position was radically different from that of either 
Canada or the United States, this frame of mind closely approximated 
mainstream thinking in those two countries. One might have expected 
that the island nation's proximity to the continent, coupled with its 
recent participation in the Great War, wou ld have erased any thoughts 
on the part of its inhabitants that they might be able to stand aloof from 
Europe. Instead Keynes ' s assault on the injustice and immorality of Ver­
sailles resulted in a guilty population unable to justify the peace and 
unwil l ing to enforce i t . 5 1 
From there it was but a small step to belief in the merits of 'splendid 
isolation.' By the mid-i920s in Britain, the concept that 'if peace is to be 
obtained, it must be paid for by certain sacrifices, the assumption of cer­
tain obligations,' was , one observer noted at the time, greeted with 'gen­
uine bewilderment . ' 5 2 In any event, the domestic situation precluded 
such an activist role. TVe cannot act alone as the. policeman of the 
world , ' Bonar L a w announced in 1 9 2 2 , 'the financial and social condi­
tion of the country makes that imposs ib le . ' 5 3 ' Imperial isolation' became 
the rallying cry of many British conservatives: the repudiation of expan­
sionism in favour of strengthening the empire, the emphasizing of 
nationalism over internationalism, the resolve not to permit government 
policy to be beholden to any supranational institution, the desire to 
defend existing interests rather than to seek out new responsibilities. 5 4 
Based on these considerations, being a member of the 'League of 
Notions' was tantamount, one conservative organ suggested, to 'expos­
ing England 's throat to the assassin's kni fe . ' 5 5 A t best, 'the average con­
servative thought of it as a forum in which disputes could be aired and, 
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if all went wel l , settled,' one observer later commented. 'The League 's 
function was not to do but to b e . ' 5 6 A t worst , many on the right v i ewed 
the organization with contempt and suspicion, scepticism and distrust, 
because of the threat they bel ieved it posed to national sovereignty . 5 7 
Imperial isolationism perhaps found its most vocal champion during 
the 1920s in the Round Table movement , which included the likes of 
Amery , Curzon, Cecil, and Christie. During that decade the members of 
this group were concerned about international peace and security, but 
they were soon disillusioned with the League of Nations. Britain ought 
not to become embroiled in Europe any more than necessary. The country 
'must be made to look a w a y towards the outer wor ld , as she a lways has 
done in the past,' Philip Kerr , later Lord Lothian, maintained. Accord­
ingly, he and other Round Table members took as their main goals the 
consolidation of imperial unity and the enhancement of Anglo-American 
relations. 5 8 Indeed, it w a s with an eye to not alienating the dominions or 
the United States that the Round Table v i ewed the League of Nat ions . 5 9 
Thus, given Canadian and Amer ican attitudes towards that body, the 
group looked askance at the Geneva Protocol's plan to bolster the 
League 's collective security powers . It perhaps made sense as a pact 
between continental nations, but from Britain's perspective, agreeing to 
support compulsory arbitration and automatic sanctions might seriously 
impair imperial and Anglo-Amer ican collaboration. The League should 
confine its activities to fostering dialogue. The Round Table's assessment 
of Locarno was similar. On the one hand, it welcomed this rapproche­
ment in the relationship between France and Germany as wel l as the 
treaty's limitation of Britain's continental commitment to western 
Europe. On the other, the group bemoaned even that obligation, not to 
mention the fact that, in assuming a responsibility that her dominions did 
not endorse, the mother country w a s imperill ing the diplomatic unity of 
the empire . 6 0 British governments of the 1920s refused to adhere to the 
Geneva Protocol, signed the Locarno Pact comforted by the fact that it 
actually diluted the nation's continental commitment and placed condi­
tions on British acceptance of the Kel logg-Briand Pact similar to those 
enacted by the American Senate . 6 1 
Thus, Anglo-American-Canadian diplomatic relations in the 1920s did 
not evolve in a vacuum but we re p layed out against a backdrop of various 
domestic factors operating within all three countries. A n d a particular 
kind of collective ideological climate born of the Great War and w a r y of 
undertakings that might lead to a repetition of that ghastly experience 
helped to fuse the individual lines that comprised the North Atlantic 
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triangle. Within it, however , there were differences of opinion over how 
best to achieve the goals of peace and security. One w a y for Britain to 
maintain its position w a s to promote just what the Round Table sug­
gested: strong imperial unity and cordial Anglo-Amer ican relations. But 
Canada, the senior dominion, proved uncooperative and the United 
States hostile. 
NORTH A M E R I C A N WITHDRAWAL 
Although many have attributed to King the dr ive for Canadian auton­
omy, which resulted in the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of 
Westminster of 1 9 3 1 , as wel l as the gradual shift in focus towards the 
United States, it is wrong to do s o . 6 2 The pursuit of autonomy and Can­
ada's move towards the United States began not with King but wi th 
Robert Borden and his successor, Arthur Meighen, as they sought to 
come to terms with the changed circumstances of the postwar wor ld . 
For most of his career Robert Borden championed the British Empire 
and promoted the idea of a cooperative imperial commonwealth. Bor­
den believed that through a process of continuous consultation between 
London and the self-governing dominions, Britain could establish a 
strong and unified foreign policy for the empi re . 6 3 This goal been 
achieved, in part, at the Imperial War Conference of 1 9 1 7 , when Borden 
and Jan Smuts of South Africa pushed through Resolution IX. It 
declared that Britain 'should recognise the right of the Dominions and 
India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and 
should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all 
important matters of common Imperial concern. ' 6 4 
A t the time Borden hailed this resolution as a major step - but in 
which direction? Borden himself was not sure. In one breath he told 
the Canadian House of C o m m o n s in 1 9 1 7 that Resolution IX d id 'not 
sacrifice in the slightest degree the autonomy of the power of self-
governmenf in Canada; in the next he al luded to the 'opportunity for 
consultation, co-operation and united action' between Canada and Brit­
a i n 6 ' If Borden still believed that Canadian autonomy could be 
squared with a unified imperial foreign policy throughout 1 9 1 8 , he 
was beginning to change his v i e w by the end of the war . The first indi­
cation came at meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet during the sum­
mer of 1 9 1 8 when he launched a scathing attack on the conduct of the 
war and warned British leaders that unless Canada could have a 'voice 
in the foreign relations of the empire as a whole , she wou ld before 
The Decade of Transition 93 
long have an independent voice in her own foreign affairs outside the 
empire.'*6 
Although the British worked hard to secure Canadian representation 
at the Paris Peace Conference, they had no intention of permitting Can­
ada a full voice in imperial affairs. Lloyd George was willing to allow 
full Canadian participation in a series of preliminary inter-Allied confer­
ences, but little more. 6 7 As he became more and more disillusioned, Bor­
den began to believe that perhaps the time had come for Canada to take 
a new direction. In words that could have emanated from the pen of 
King, Borden wrote in his diary one late night in early December 1 9 1 8 : 'I 
am beginning to feel that in the end and perhaps sooner than later, Can­
ada must assume full sovereignty. She can give better service to G[reat] 
B[ritain] & U(nited) S(tates) & to the world in that way . ' 6 8 Borden took 
the first steps in this direction at the end of December 1 9 1 8 when he told 
the British cabinet: 'if the future policy of the British Empire meant 
working in co-operation with some European nation as against the 
United States, that policy could not reckon on the approval or the sup­
port of Canada. Canada's view was that as an Empire we should keep 
clear, as far as possible, of European complications and alliances. This 
feeling had been immensely strengthened by the experience of the war, 
into which w e had been drawn by old-standing pledges and more recent 
understandings, of which the Dominions had not even been aware. ' 6 9 
The same day he also announced, against British wishes, that Canada 
was going to withdraw the expeditionary force that had been sent to 
Siberia to fight the Bolsheviks.7" 
Admittedly, Borden does not appear to have abandoned completely 
his hope for some form of imperial unity. But in these statements there 
was clearly an expression of a new national awareness of Canada's posi­
tion in the postwar world, a new self-interest, and a sense of the role 
Canada might play, namely, as potential peacemaker - or linchpin -
between Britain and the United States. The chance for just such a role 
was not long in coming. The United States and Britain, allies of late, 
were entering a decade that would be characterized by growing antago­
nism. A s one American observed in 1919: 'relations between the two 
countries are beginning to assume the same character as that between 
England and Germany before the war. ' 7 1 One issue over which Britain 
and the United States disagreed was the Anglo-Japanese alliance. First 
negotiated in 1902, it had been renewed in 1905 and again, for ten years, 
in 1 9 1 1 . In 1921 it was up for renewal. Americans took a dim view of the 
alliance. It was, in the words of former secretary of state, Elihu Root, 
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'regarded by the people as an alliance between Great Britain and J apan 
against the United Sta tes . ' 7 2 
Against this background of mounting tension Ar thur Meighen 
travelled to London to attend the 1 9 2 1 Imperial Conference. H e went 
with one aim: to make sure the British did not renew the al l iance. 7 3 
Arguing that the renewal of the alliance wou ld have a disastrous effect 
on Canadian-American relations, Meighen threatened to dissociate C a n ­
ada from any British attempt to form an alliance with J a p a n . 7 4 His rea­
soning is instructive. 'If w e now in this state of affairs renew a 
confidential and exclusive relationship with J a p a n / he told delegates at 
the Imperial Conference, 'it is whol ly impossible to argue convincingly, 
to m y mind, that it is not going to affect detrimentally our relations wi th 
the United States, no matter h o w steadfastly the British Government sets 
its face to keep those relations g o o d . ' 7 5 Canada thus urgently and suc­
cessfully helped to pressure Britain to end the alliance. It w a s replaced 
by a series of agreements reached at the Washington Conference of 
1 9 2 1 - 2 , the most important of which w a s the Five Power Treaty limiting 
a tonnage ratio for capital ships - warships over 10,000 tons carrying 
guns larger than eight inches. The ratio w a s 5 : 5 : 3 : 1 . 7 5 : 1 . 7 5 for, respec­
tively, Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. Borden w a s 
called out of retirement to represent Canada at the conference. 
That the Americans had been urging Canada to oppose the alliance 
cannot be doubted - Root, for example, did so in the belief that the 
termination of the alliance and British acceptance of the Washington 
treaties wou ld make Britain more dependent on American suppor t . 7 6 
Nevertheless, Meighen and Borden believed that they had demonstrated 
two things during the Imperial and Washington conferences. One w a s 
that Canada could act as a linchpin between Britain and the United 
States. The other w a s that the Imperial Conference had demonstrated 
the viability of a unified imperial foreign policy based on consultation. 
In reality, however , they had acted in the self-interest of Canada , and in 
so doing they had succeeded in knocking out the foundation of British 
policy in the Far East, demonstrated that if forced to choose between 
Britain and the United States Canada would choose the United States, 
and instilled in the British a distaste for future adventures in cooperat ive 
commonwealth experiments. In this sense they p a v e d the w a y for King . 
King ' s role has been misunderstood, an error that is understandable, 
since his policies generally had an opaque quality. Thus he has been var ­
iously portrayed as the great Canadian w h o single-handedly battled the 
British for Canadian autonomy or as the demon w h o broke the British 
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connection and led Canada into the arms of the United States or as the 
crafty statesman w h o reversed the policies of Borden and Meighen . 7 7 
The 'truth' - if it can be said to exist in history - probably lies some­
where between these conflicting v iews . K ing d id not so much reverse 
policy as follow what Borden had started to its logical conclusion. He 
was undoubtedly a Canadian nationalist w h o sought autonomy, but he 
did not favour breaking the imperial tie. H e favoured closer relations 
with the United States, but not too close. A s one Amer ican observer later 
pointed out: Canada 'wished to get all the benefits out of the protection 
afforded her by geography, by membership in the British Empire, and 
by friendship with the United States without assuming any responsibili­
t ies . ' 7 8 That may be the definitive statement of Canadian foreign policy 
in the interwar years. 
King was not long in demonstrating where he stood on the question of 
Canadian autonomy. In September 1 9 2 2 the British government asked 
each of the dominions for assistance in confronting a Turkish threat to 
Britain's garrison at Chanak, on the banks of the Dardanelles in As ia 
Minor. Owing to s loppy practices, the uncoded cable communicating 
this request reached Canadian newspaper offices before the government 
was aware of the appeal. King first learned of its contents from a news­
paper reporter. Ottawa took no action. A n irate King politely but stiffly 
notified the British that only the Canadian Parliament could decide what 
course the country wou ld follow - and he had no intention of calling 
Parliament into sess ion. 7 9 The Chanak crisis w a s instructive for many 
Canadians. Meighen 's attempt to embarrass King with his 'Ready, aye, 
ready ' speech did not succeed. For if it w a s true that European states­
manship had catapulted the wor ld headlong into the Great War, it was 
equally true that British statesmen were European. A n d if bungling Brit­
ish diplomats had helped to p lunge the w o r l d into a devastating four-
year holocaust, so had the peculiar nature of the dominion 's relationship 
to Britain automatically m a d e it a party to the conflict. That ruinous 
experience, compounded now by the i rksome circumstances surround­
ing Chanak, served during the first decade of peace to strengthen the 
unsettling knowledge that Canadians we re not in control of starting the 
engine of war . Canada ' s ties with the mother country we re quite capable 
of d rawing the dominion into hostilities not of its o w n interest or mak­
ing. Canada did not yet exercise full authority over the making of w a r 
and peace. The dominion could determine the nature and extent of its 
participation in British wars , but it w a s automatically a belligerent the 
moment Britain w a s one. 
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This lesson, of course, was not lost on King, and he certainly inflicted 
a further dent in the concept of a unified policy for the empire at the 
Imperial Conference of 1923 . There, he nipped in the bud any talk of 
continuous consultation, coordination of defence policies, and commit­
ments in advance to support British foreign policy. There, too, the 
dominions' right to sign their own treaties with other countries w a s 
enshrined.8" Nevertheless, the prospect of joint diplomatic action with 
London remained a powerful bogey for many Canadians throughout 
the 1920s. J .S. Ewart, for example, a close friend of King, suggested that 
it was doubtful whether Britain really desired sincerely to confer with 
Canada. 'We understand you perfectly,' he wrote in a book intended for 
British as well as Canadian eyes, 'France wants to be able to call blacks 
and browns from Africa; and you want to be able to summon whites 
from Canada to fight blacks, browns, or other whites as you m a y think 
your interests require. ' 8 ' 
Thus the Locarno Pact, about which London had not consulted 
Ottawa, which appeared between two general elections in Canada , w a s 
a disturbing development. 'We cannot admit [that w e are] automatically 
committed to all Britain's wars , ' Skelton maintained. 'Canada can best 
decide on her course in the light of the facts and circumstances of the 
time, rather than give a blank cheque now to whatever men m a y be in 
power in London in 1940; their case wil l be more circumspect if (they 
are] not sure of our support in advance . ' 8 2 For Christie, Locarno had to 
be the parting of company with Britain. 'I cannot escape the conviction,' 
he wrote to Borden in February 1926, 'that... in order to play our unique 
part in the English-speaking wor ld w e must assume a more indepen­
dent and detached position than existing forms allow u s . ' 8 ' That goal 
was achieved in large measure at the 1926 Imperial Conference, which 
produced the Balfour Declaration proclaiming that the dominions and 
Britain were 'in no w a y subordinate to one another in any aspect of their 
domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to 
the Crown and freely associated as members of the British C o m m o n ­
wealth of Nations. ' The conference also agreed that the dominions could 
not 'be committed to the acceptance of active obligations, except with 
the definite consent of their own governments.'** 
Although there were those w h o grumbled that the Balfour Declara­
tion did not provide enough freedom from Downing Street, it w a s 
nevertheless a significant shift a w a y from Britain. On the one hand, 
J.S. Ewart observed in 1927 regarding the Canadian outlook: 'antipathy 
toward Americans has decreased, and is now tending to d isappear ... 
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making impossible the perpetuation of a Canadian felling of antagonism 
to the United States ' . 8 5 On the other, 'there is an increasing disinclination 
to participate actively in British war s merely because they are British.' 
Many believed that Canada ' s future lay in North America and the nur­
turing of relations with the United States. After all, as Christie pointed 
out, it was 'a s imple truth of geography and history that Canadians are 
North American and not European . ' 8 6 So far as Skelton was concerned, 
Canada 's future lay 'in her o w n reasonableness, the decency of her 
neighbour, and the steady development of friendly intercourse, com­
mon standards of conduct, and common points of v i e w . ' 8 7 In the light of 
this attitude it was of no small consequence that Canadian autonomy 
was first demonstrated by the establishment of diplomatic missions, in 
Washington in 1926 followed by Paris in 1928 and Tokyo a year later. 
British recognition of that autonomy occurred in 1928 with the appoint­
ment of a high commissioner to Ot tawa. 8 8 A s King prepared to go to 
Paris to sign the Kel logg-Briand Pact in 1929, he reflected proudly on his 
achievements in foreign policy: T am convinced the period of my admin­
istration wi l l l ive in this particular as an epoch in the history of Canada 
that was formative and memorable . ' 8 9 Indeed it was , but another epoch 
in Canadian history in the making was the economic shift towards the 
United States. 
THE ECONOMIC SHIFT 
The Great War 's enormous impact on the international economy inevita­
bly affected economic relations within the North Atlantic triangle. In the 
pre-war era Great Britain had functioned as the commercial and eco­
nomic centre of the wor ld . The w a r dealt a serious b low to sterling and 
Britain's pre-eminent economic position. The gap thus created was to a 
large degree filled by the United States. During the 1920s Amer ica rose 
to a nearly commanding position as the international financial centre. A 
debtor nation by nearly $4 billion in 1 9 1 4 , the United States emerged 
from the w a r a net creditor to the tune of about $ 1 0 billion. B y 1 9 2 2 this 
figure had risen to some $ 1 7 billion. Other indicators of Amer ica ' s new 
position are equally telling. In 1900, for example, the United States held 
roughly 3 per cent of the wor ld ' s long-term investments; by 1929 it held 
more than 30 per cent. Between 1920 and 1929 American private inves­
tors lent more than $7 .5 billion to foreign bor rowers . 9 0 
B y contrast, Britain emerged from the w a r in a weakened and precari­
ous state. The nation faced declining trade, unemployment that ran to 
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nearly 1 8 per cent in the early 1920s , shrinking gold reserves, and, at 
least initially, g rowing public unrest in the form of str ikes. 9 1 A b o v e all, 
Britain was in debt, and in debt to the United States to the tune of about 
$4.7 billion. British hopes for the cancellation of w a r debts, however , 
were dashed. The Americans proved unwil l ing to cancel, and this reluc­
tance gave rise to the notion that the United States wanted to exert eco­
nomic dominance over Britain. T h e central ambition of ... American 
politicians/ the British ambassador, Auck land Geddes , informed his 
government in 1920, 'is to win for America the position of leading nation 
in the wor ld and also leader among the English-speaking nations. To do 
this they intend to have the strongest n a v y and the largest mercantile 
marine. They intend also to prevent us from pay ing our debt by sending 
goods to America and they look for the opportunity to treat us as a vas­
sal State so long as the debt remains unpa id . ' 9 2 By the mid-i920s there 
was considerable bad feeling in Britain. 'The debts and similar claims on 
the part of the United States have already made the average Englishman 
think the Americans are dirty s w i n e / wrote a senior Foreign Office 
official. 9 3 
There is little evidence to suggest that the United States wanted to 
reduce Britain to a vassal state, as Hughes w a s wel l aware: 'There wi l l 
be no permanent peace unless economic satisfactions are enjoyed. ' 9 4 
Rather, as Frank Costigliola has pointed out, both Britain and the United 
States wanted to reconstruct the international economy, but each 
wanted to do so on terms that w o u l d fulfil its o w n national interests. For 
the United States it meant an international economy based on the con­
cept of the free market-place, the open door, and a return to the gold 
standard. For Britain it meant a London-centred financial bloc, reduced 
w a r debts, stabilized prices, and internationally regulated capital 
f l ows . 9 5 Possessing more economic clout, the Amer icans w o n the battle 
during the 1 9 2 0 s . 9 6 Indications that the United States w o n the day we re 
apparent in a shift in trade and investment patterns within the North 
Atlantic triangle, particularly with respect to Canada. 
Prior to the Great War Canada had balanced its imports from the 
United States through exports to Britain. The United States accounted 
for an average of 60 per cent of all the goods Canada imported whi le 
Britain accounted for an average of 53 per cent of all the goods Canada 
exported between 1900 and 1 9 1 4 . During those same years Canada 
imported only 23 per cent of its goods from Britain and exported 36 per 
cent of all its goods to the United States. A s these figures suggest, in the 
pre-war era the vast bulk of Canadian trade w a s carried out within the 
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North Atlantic triangle - 83 per cent of all import and 89 per cent of all 
export trade was with the United States and Bri tain. 9 7 The w a r signifi­
cantly affected these trade patterns. During the 1920s Canadian imports 
from the United States rose from an average of 60 per cent to 68 per cent; 
exports to Britain declined from an average of 53 per cent to 36 per cent. 
During the 1920s there w a s also a further decline in imports, from Brit­
ain to 16 .5 per cent of total imports, whi le exports to the United States 
rose to an average of 39 per cent for the decade. In terms of overall trade, 
84.5 per cent of Canadian import trade and 75 per cent of export trade 
were done with Britain and the United States. Clearly, the most signifi­
cant development w a s the decline in Canadian trade, especially export 
trade, with Britain and the increasing trade with the United States. In 
fact, in 1 9 2 1 Canada exported more to other countries than it did to Brit­
ain - $312 ,845 million worth of goods were exported to Britain, $333,995 
million to 'other' countr ies . 9 8 This trend wou ld continue throughout the 
decade, so that by 1929 the total trade between Canada and the United 
States ($1 ,372 billion) w a s larger than that of the total trade between Brit­
ain and the United States ( $ 1 , 1 7 8 bi l l ion) . 9 9 
Far more significant than the changing trade pattern was the dramatic 
shift in investment. In 1 9 1 3 British investment represented 75 per cent of 
the total foreign capital invested in Canada. Fol lowing the w a r that 
figure fell to 57 per cent and then declined steadily, so that by 1 9 3 0 only 
36 per cent of foreign investment in Canada originated in Britain. A t the 
same time American investment in Canada g rew from a pre-war rate of 
23 per cent of total investment to 36 per cent in 1 9 1 9 and then to 61 per 
cent in 1930 . The turning point w a s 1 9 2 2 , when, for the first time, A m e r ­
ican investment in Canada exceeded British investment . 1 0 0 B y the mid-
19203 total Amer ican investment had passed the $3 billion mark and 
continued at an annual rate of $2 .5 million for the remainder of the 
decade . 1 0 1 This shift w a s of some concern to the British, w h o were wor ­
ried that increasing Amer ican economic influence in Canada posed a 
threat to the imperial link, if not to the empire itself. 'American money 
power is trying to get hold of the natural resources of the empire, ' 
warned Baldwin in 1928 . T h e y are work ing like b e a v e r s . ' 1 0 2 (The refer­
ence to Canada ' s national emblem w a s probably unintended.) Britain 
did little to rectify the situation. Sterling remained weak through much 
of the 1920s , and displeasure over losses suffered in railroad bankrupt­
cies tended to make British investors shy of C a n a d a . 1 0 3 
None of the foregoing is to imp ly that Canada had jumped, or w a s 
wil l ing to jump, into Amer ica ' s economic bed. There were a number of 
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problems in Canadian-American economic relations, most of them stem­
ming from the high-tariff policies the United States employed . More­
over, throughout the 1920s King sought increased economic ties wi th 
Britain, most notably at the 1 9 2 3 Imperial Economic Conference . 1 0 4 Try­
ing to explain the aims of his budget at the end of the decade, K ing 
wrote: 'It is essential to increase, not decrease, imports from Britain if w e 
wish to increase our exports to Britain, and the Budget ensures this by 
diverting trade from the United States to Br i ta in . ' 1 0 5 Further attempts to 
increase Canada 's trade with Britain wou ld be made during the 1930s , 
but the economic shift that occurred during the 1920s wou ld never be 
reversed. 
A N G L O - A M E R I C A N N A V A L R I V A L R Y 
At one point during the Washington Conference of 1 9 2 1 - 2 Borden had a 
disturbing conversation wi th Admira l Sir Ernie Chatfield, then serving 
as assistant chief of naval staff. 'Admira l Chatfield, ' he recorded in his 
diary, 'whom personally I like, indulged in some loose and foolish talk 
as to his wil l ingness to fight [the] United States with an inferior fleet. He 
does not seem to realise that w a r between the two countries w o u l d mean 
the destruction of a civilisation [sic] already rocking under the impact 
of the late w a r . ' 1 0 6 Chatfield's comments and Borden's concern under­
scored what w o u l d deve lop into probably the most serious problem for 
the North Atlantic triangle during the 1920s: the Anglo-Amer ican nava l 
rivalry. The British official naval historian, Stephen Roskil l , character­
ized the period from 1 9 1 9 to 1929 as 'the period of Anglo-Amer ican 
antagonism. ' 1 0 7 B y the autumn of 1928 Anglo-Amer ican relations had so 
declined as a result of the naval issue that Robert Craigie , the head of the 
American Department of the Foreign Office, w a s writ ing that ' w a r is not 
unthinkable between the two countr ies . ' 1 0 8 
The immediate origins of the Anglo-Amer ican r ivalry can be traced to 
the summer of 1 9 1 5 , w h e n the General Board of the United States N a v y 
recommended that 'the N a v y of the United States should ultimately be 
equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the 
w o r l d . ' 1 0 9 Thus w a s born the 'second to none' naval policy that the 
United States sought to initiate in the naval construction programs of 
1 9 1 6 and 1 9 1 8 . A s it originally stood, the 1 9 1 8 program w a s to produce 
1,000 ships, including twelve battleships and sixteen bat t lecruisers . 1 1 0 
Al though the Amer ican naval program w a s reduced to 1 5 6 ships after 
the war , in part because of the domestic opposition of the ' M u g w u m p ' 
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factor and the National Counci l for the Limitation of Armaments , it nev­
ertheless caused considerable concern in Br i ta in . 1 1 1 Churchill believed 
that there was an element of h luff and bluster' behind it, but he was 
not 'prepared to take dictation from the US. ' 'We do not wish to put 
ourselves in the power of the United States/ he warned the cabinet . 1 1 2 
This was an important consideration indeed, because the security and 
well-being of the empire depended upon a powerful navy, and in then-
weakened financial situation the British had no desire to meet new chal­
lenges. A s Sir Ernie Chatfield, the first sea lord, later observed: 'We are 
in the remarkable position of not want ing to quarrel with anybody 
because w e have got most of the wor ld already, or the best parts of it, 
and w e only want to keep wha t w e have got and prevent others taking it 
a w a y from u s . ' 1 1 3 
The problem w a s how to accomplish the task. Despite the fact that 
Britain had emerged from the Great War with the wor ld ' s largest navy -
sixty-one battleships, which was more than the Amer ican and French 
navies combined, 1 2 0 cruisers, and 466 destroyers - it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to maintain that super ior i ty . 1 1 4 Britain had been 
weakened by the w a r and faced the difficulty of trying to finance a large 
military machine to oversee empire commitments. The Royal N a v y 
alone swa l lowed about £ 1 6 0 million, or 20 per cent of government 
expenditure in 1 9 1 9 - 2 0 , at a time w h e n budget estimates were shrink­
i n g . 1 1 5 In an effort to retrench, Britain was forced to abandon one of its 
long-standing policies: the T w o - P o w e r Standard. ' Adopted in 1889, this 
policy held that the Royal N a v y should be as strong as the combined 
might of any two powers . Unable to continue such a goal, Britain 
adopted the 'One-Power Standard ' in 1920 . The United States naval pro­
gram w a s therefore v i ewed as a threat, or at least as a potential threat . 1 1 6 
Al though the Washington Conference settled some outstanding dif­
ferences in Anglo-American relations by setting limits on capital ships, 
the treaties said nothing about cruisers. It w a s over the limitation of 
cruiser building that the next round began. Here the British enjoyed a 
decided advantage over the Americans and they wanted to keep it that 
w a y . When Cool idge put forward a proposal in 1924 to hold a second 
Washington conference to limit construction of smaller-class ships, the 
British refused. The Americans kept pressing, and in 1927 the British 
agreed to attend the ill-fated Cool idge conference, which met in Geneva 
during the summer. By this time there w a s close to open talk of w a r 
between Britain and the United States. The basic problem w a s neatly 
summed up by Lord Jellicoe: 'The Amer ican programme has only one 
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object in v iew, viz . Equality with Great Britain on the sea. We cannot 
help it if they build up to our required standard, but w e can avoid low­
ering our standard to suit them. ' 1 1 7 Should the Americans gain the 
upper hand, in Churchil l 's v iew, they would then be 'in a position to 
give us orders about our policy, say, in India or Egypt , or Canada or any 
other great matter behind which their electioneering forces were mar­
shalled ... I wou ld neither trust America to command, nor England to 
submit . ' 1 1 8 It was not until the London Nava l Conference of 1930 that the 
United States and Britain came to an agreement, and even then relations 
were less than cord ia l . 1 1 9 
This Anglo-American naval r ivalry concerned Canada deeply for a 
number of reasons, chief of which w a s that Canada a lways suffered 
when Anglo-American relations soured - and a w a r wou ld be an unmit­
igated disaster, since Canada wou ld likely be a battleground. This w a s , 
in fact, one of the arguments Meighen advanced at the 1 9 2 1 Imperial 
Conference. 1 2 0 Hence, during the 1920s and the 1930s Canada repeatedly 
sought to promote good Anglo-American relations. A s Walter Hose 
noted: 'We, who k n o w the U.S., should be in a position to g ive advice 
which may prevent the British Cabinet being led into playing the U.S. 
Big N a v y Party's game by the Admi ra l t y . ' 1 2 1 Another Canadian concern 
rose from a general mistrust of the United States. Canada w a s most cer­
tainly moving towards the United States in terms of trade and attitudes 
to Europe, but that trend did not extend to military matters. Walter Hose 
strongly warned against Canada ' s 'placing itself entirely in the hands of 
the friendly ne ighbour . ' 1 2 2 Other military figures, such as James Suther­
land Brown and A . G . L . McNaughton, did not discount the possibility of 
war . Brown w a s in fact the author of 'Defence Scheme N o . 1 / a plan that 
actually called for a 'first strike' at the United States in the event of 
t rouble. 1 2 3 
In the end, of course, the United States and Britain did not go to war . 
But the Anglo-American naval rivalry served to demonstrate the precar­
ious nature of the triangular relationship during the 1920s. M a n y of the 
problems that arose during the postwar decade wou ld reappear during 
the 1930s - though there wou ld be a different set of circumstances and, 
once again, different responses. Indeed, Canada w o u l d once more join 
the mother country in war , again temporarily leaving the Americans 
behind on the sidelines. But it w a s the last gasp of an already altered tri­
angular relationship. The 1920s represented the beginning of a transition 
that would continue through the course of the twentieth century, and 
that was the gradual shift in power a w a y from Britain and towards the 
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United States. For Canada , more than any other country, adaptation to 
the new order of things w a s imperative, controversial, and tumultuous. 
N O T E S 
1 Borden diary, 1 1 November 1918, Borden Papers, National Archives of Can­
ada, Ottawa (hereafter NAC); Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His 
Memoirs, Vol. II (Toronto, 1969), 157. 
2 For the wider impact of the war, see Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern 
Memory (Oxford, 1975). 
3 Although dated, one of the few studies of the triangular relationship during 
these years is J.B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the 
United States and Great Britain (New York, 1945; Toronto, 1966). 
4 For example, Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States 
Foreign Policy (New York, 1968). 
5 Cf. Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War and Peace (Arlington 
Heights, IL, 1979); N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: 
America's Reponse to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Klaus Schwabe, 
Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peace-Making, 1918-1919 
(Chapel Hill, NC, 1985). 
6 For an overview, see Warren I. Cohen, Empire without Tears: America's For­
eign Relations, 1921-1033 (New York, 1987); Frank Costigliola, Awkward 
Dominion: America's Political, Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe, 
1919-1933 (Ithaca, NY, 1985). 
7 Selig Adler, The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy between 
the Wars (New York, 1965); R.E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's 
Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953). 
8 William Appleman Williams, 'The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s,' 
Science and Society, 18(1954), 1-20. 
9 See especially C P . Parrini, Heir to Empire: The United States Economic Diplo­
macy, 1916-1923 (Pittsburgh, 1969). 
10 For example, William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplo­
macy (New York, 1959). 
1 1 See Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933 
(Lexington, KY, 1971) . 
1 2 See D.C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-197; 
(Cambridge, 1984), 40-68. 
1 3 Churchill served in a variety of positions during and after the war, includ­
ing secretary for war (and air), 1 9 1 8 - 2 1 , colonial secretary, 1921-22 , chancel­
lor of the Exchequer, 1924-9. 
104 The North Atlantic Triangle 
14 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 49-50. 
1 5 Cf. C P Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External 
Policies, 2 vols (Toronto, 1977,1981) ; P.G. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to 
Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926 (Cambridge, 1977). 
J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canada and the 
United States to the 1990s (Toronto, 1991), ch. 3, provides a good overview of 
Canadian-American relations. 
16 Standard works include R.C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden: A Biography, 2 vols 
(Toronto, 1975,1980); W.R. Graham, Arthur Meighen: A Biography (Toronto, 
1960-5); R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political 
Biography, Vol. 1,1874-1923 (Toronto, 1958); H.B. Neatby, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King. Vol. 11,1924-1932: The Lonely Heights (Toronto, 1970). 
17 On Hose, see Roger Sarty, 'Entirely in the Hand of the Friendly Neighbour': 
The Canadian Armed Forces and the Defence of the Pacific Coast, 1909-
1939/ unpublished paper, 1990. 
18 For a wider study, see J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service 
Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto, 1982). 
19 Christie memorandum, 10 December 1914, Borden Papers, vol. 659, ff. 
67875-80. Cf. Robert Bothwell, Loring Christie: The Failure of Bureaucratic 
Imperialism (New York, 1988). 
20 Norman Hillmer, 'The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O.D. Skel-
ton,' in Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship, ed. P. Lyon 
(London, 1976), 61-84. 
21 See J.L. Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the 
United States (Toronto, 1989). 
22 Quoted in Margaret Prang, N.W. Rowell: Ontario Nationalist (Toronto, 1975), 
361. 
23 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 23: Records of the 
Fifth Assembly (Geneva, 1924), 222. 
24 Borden, Memoirs, II, 1 8 0 - 1 . 
25 Ramsay Cook, ed., The Dafoe-Sifton Correspondence, 1919-1927 (Altona, Man., 
1966), 45, 74, 203. 
26 Quoted in Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto, 1975), 
8. 
27 Christie to Meighen, 23 December 1925, Meighen Papers [NAC] vol. 64; 
Christie to Borden, 5 January 1925, Christie Papers [NAC] vol. 10, file 3 1 . 
28 Christie memorandum, 'Responsible Government: The Last Stage,' 1 5 June 
1926, Christie Papers, vol. 26, file 106. 
29 Skelton 'Notes on the Protocol of Geneva,' Department of External Affairs 
Records (hereafter DEA) [NAC], vol. 813, file 629 (1). 
The Decade of Transition 1 0 5 
30 Skelton memorandum on Locarno, 21 October 1925, Mackenzie King Papers 
[NAC] vol. 1 4 1 , file 1142 . 
3 1 O.D. Skelton, 'Current Events: Canada and the Making of War and Peace,' 
Queen's Quarterly, 28(July 1920), 105. 
32 Cook, Dafoe-Sifton Correspondence, 122. 
33 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1 1 September 1919, 230. 
34 See T.N. Guinsburg, The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States Senate from 
Versailles to Pearl Harbor (New York, 1982). 
35 See Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight against the League of Nations 
(Lexington, KY., 1970), 82-3. 
36 Ibid., 144. 
37 Robert J . Maddox, William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy (Baton 
Rouge, LA, 1969), 62. 
38 Quoted in W.C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American 
Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA, 1980), 316. 
39 Alexander De Conde, A History of American Foreign Policy, Vol. II: Global 
Power (1900 to the present), 3rd ed. (New York, 1978), 86-7. 
40 J.C. Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States and the Washington Confer­
ence, 1921-1922 (Athens, GA, 1955), 203. 
41 Ibid., 207, 208, 210. 
42 Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New 
York, 1957), 152 . 
43 Ibid., 207-10. 
44 Ibid., 236-7; Guinsburg, Pursuit of Isolationism, 128. 
45 Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in 
World War I (Chicago, 1967), 1 -2 ,233 . 
46 Ibid., 27-30. 
47 Adler, Isolationist Impulse, 69-70. 
48 A. Lentin, Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany: An Essay in 
the Pre-History of Appeasement (Baton Rouge, LA, 1985), 137. 
49 Paul Johnson, A History of the Modern World (London, 1983), 29-30. 
50 Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (London, 1966), 66. 
51 Lentin, Pre-History of Appeasement, 1 4 0 - 1 . 
52 Quoted in K.E. Miller, Socialism and Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Brit­
ain to 1931 (The Hague, 1967), 137-8. 
53 Quoted in Keith Robbins, Appeasement (Oxford, 1988), 30. 
54 G.C. Webber, The Ideology of the British Right, 1918-1939 (London, 1986), 1 1 5 -
16. Cf. Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 51 . 
55 A.P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power 
(London, 1959), 285. 
io6 The North Atlantic Triangle 
56 R.B. McCallum, Public Opinion and the Last Peace (London, 1944), 146. 
57 See ibid., 137-8; Robbins, Appeasement, 1 3 ; Thornton, Imperial Idea, 286-9. 
58 J.E. Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto, 1975), 
276-7. 
59 J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (London, i960), 1 1 0 . 
60 Ibid., 1 1 2 . 
61 Miller, Socialism and Foreign Policy, 148,184,186; Thornton, Imperial Idea, 290; 
W.R. Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s (London, 1977), 35. 
62 The strongest critic of Mackenzie King is Donald Creighton, Canada's First 
Century (Toronto, 1970); idem, 'Decline and Fall of the Empire of the St 
Lawrence,' Canadian Historical Association Papers (1969). 
63 Kendle, Round Table, 1 1 5 - 1 6 . 
64 Stacey, Age of Conflict, I, 213 . 
65 Ibid., 217. 
66 'Report of the Committee of Prime Ministers on War Policy,' Borden Papers, 
file OC 628; Stacey, Age of Conflict, 1,225. 
67 Lloyd George to Borden, 27 October 1918 , Documents on Canadian External 
Relations (hereafter DCER), vol. 1,218. 
68 Borden diary, 1 December 1918. 
69 Imperial War Cabinet Minutes [IWC 47], 30 December 1918, CAB [Cabinet 
Archives, Public Record Office, Kew] 23/43 
70 See Gaddis Smith, 'Canada and the Siberian Intervention, 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 1 9 / Amer­
ican Historical Review, 64(1959), 866-77; James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 
Vol. I: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto, 1964), 27-40. 
71 Quoted in Granatstein and Hillmer, For Better or for Worse, 76. 
72 Quoted in G.P. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Vol. I 
(Toronto, 1966), 59. 
73 On Meighen's role, see M.G. Fry, The North Atlantic Triangle and the 
Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance/ Journal of Modern History, 
39(1976), 46-64; Ira Klein, Whitehall, Washington, and the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 1 / Pacific Historical Review, 41(1972), 460-83; Ian Nish, 
Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923 (London, 
1972), chs 18-22. 
74 Governor-General to Colonial Secretary, 1 April 1921, CO [Colonial Office 
Archives, Public Record Office, Kew] 42/1042 
75 Minutes of the Ninth Meeting, Imperial Conference, 29 June 1921, DCER, HI. 
76 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 44; M.G. Fry, Illusions of Security: North Atlantic 
Diplomacy, 1918-1922 (Toronto, 1972), 91 -120 . 
77 See A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation (Toronto, 1957); Donald Creighton, 
Canada's First Century (Toronto, 1970); Stacey, Age of Conflict, II. 
The Decade of Transition 1 0 7 
78 'Record of meeting of Dominion Representatives,' 2 November 1937 FO 
[Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, Kew] 371/21016/06666; 
Moffat diary, 10 November 1937, J P . Moffat Papers [Harvard University]. 
The statement was made by Norman Davis. 
79 Stacey, Age of Conflict, 11 ,22-4. 
80 Wigley, Transition to Commonwealth, 173-205. 
81 J.S. Ewart, The Independence Papers, Vol. I (n.p., n.d.), 32-3. It is interesting to 
note Mackenzie King's comment on Ewart and his book: 'Ewart is very able 
& better informed than any one in Canada on foreign affairs,' he wrote in 
his diary, 'but too extreme. Is for separation. I am not, I believe in the 
Brlitish) Empire as a 'Co-operative Commonwealth.' Mackenzie King diary, 
8 April 1922. 
82 Skelton memorandum on Locarno, 21 October 1925, DEA vol. 753, file 230; 
Skelton memorandum, 1 January 1926, Mackenzie King Papers, vol. 92. 
83 Quoted in Wigley, Transition to Commonwealth, 246. 
84 Stacey, Age of Conflict, II, 86. 
85 J.S. Ewart, 'Canada, the Empire, and the United States,' Foreign Affairs, 
6(1927), 126-7. 
86 Christie to Kerr, 14 December 1925, Christie Papers, vol. 1 1 , file 35. 
87 Skelton memorandum on The Locarno Treaties,' 1 January 1926, Mackenzie 
King Papers, vol. 139. 
88 See Norman Hillmer, 'A British High Commissioner for Canada, 1927-28/ 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 3(1973), 339-56. 
89 Quoted in John Thompson and Allen Seager, Canada, 1922-1939: Decades of 
Discord (Toronto, 1985), 57. 
90 Gabriel Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History (New York, 1984), 
195ft; W.R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World (Oxford, 1984), 9 5 - 1 1 1 . See 
also C P . Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1920-1939 (Los Angeles, 
1973), 31-82 , for what is probably the best overview. 
91 See A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-194; (Oxford, 1965), esp. xxi-xxvii, 
120-6 ,163; Frank Costigliola, 'Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 
1920s,' Journal of Economic History, 37(1977), 9 1 1 . 
92 Quoted in Roberta Dayer, The British War Debts to the United States and 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1920-1923/ Pacific Historical Review, 45(1976), 
577-
93 Hurst [FO legal adviser) minute, 28 October 1925, FO 371 /10646 /5376 / 
1490. 
94 Quoted in M. Leffler, 'Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or 
Diplomatic Realism: American Policy toward Western Europe 1 9 2 1 - 1 9 3 3 / 
Perspectives in American History, 8(1974), 416. 
io8 The North Atlantic Triangle 
95 Costigliola, 'Anglo-American Financial Rivalry/ 9 1 3 - 1 5 . 
96 It should be noted that the United States was unable to supplant British 
influence in China. See Roberta Dayer, Finance and Empire: Sir Charles Addis, 
1861-1945 (New York, 1988), xviii; Christopher Thome, Allies of a Kind: The 
United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941-1945 (Oxford, 1978), 17; 
cf. Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar: The First Era, 1919-1952 (Balti­
more, 1969). B.J.C. McKercher, 'Wealth, Power, and the New International 
Order: Britain and the American Challenge in the 1920s,' Diplomatic History, 
12(1988), 4 1 1 - 4 1 , argues the revisionist case that Britain successfully resisted 
the American challenge. 
97 These figures are from Stacey, Age of Conflict, II, 356-9. We have calculated 
the averages. 
98 The figures are from ibid., 432-5. We have made the calculations. 
99 Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, 300. 
100 Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy 
(Toronto, 1991), 450. 
101 Ibid.; Stephen Scheinberg, Invitation to Empire: Tariffs and American Eco­
nomic Expansion in Canada/ in Enterprise and National Development: Essays 
in Canadian Business and Economic History, ed. Glenn Porter and Robert D. 
Cuff (Toronto, 1973), 94. 
102 Quoted in Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 60. 
103 See Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, 296. 
104 See Wigley, Transition to Commonwealth, 199-205. 
105 Document 13 (Mackenzie King to Morton, 14 June 1930), in I.M. Drum-
mond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939 (London, 1972), 
180-2. 
106 Quoted in Stacey, Age of Conflict, I, 352. 
107 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. I: The Period of Anglo-
American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London, 1968). 
108 Craigie memorandum, 'Outstanding Problems affecting Anglo-American 
Relations/ 1 2 November 1928 (emphasis in original), FO 3 7 1 / 1 2 8 1 2 / 7 8 9 5 / 
39-
109 Roskill, Naval Policy, 1 ,20-1 . 
1 1 0 Ibid., 90-1. 
1 1 1 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, 42. 
1 1 2 Churchill memorandum, 20 July 1927, quoted in ibid., 58-9. 
1 1 3 Chatfield to Fisher, 4 June 1934, quoted in Christopher Thome, The Limits of 
Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 
(New York, 1973), 397-8. 
1 1 4 Roskill, Naval Policy, I, 70. 
The Decade of Transition 109 
115 McKercher. "Wealth. Power, and the New international Order,' 424. 
116 Roskill, Hanoi Policy, I.70. 
uj Ibid.. 516. 
118 Quoted in Watt, Succeeding /<*« Bull, y>. 
119 Raymond G. O'Connor, Perilous E^Hi/ihnum TJir United Slate) and the London 
Naval Confrrcmxof njo (Lawrence. KS. 1962). Cf. GregC. Kennedy, The 
1930 London Naval Conference and Anglo-American Maritime Strength, 
1917-1930', in Armf Limitation and Disarmament Restraints on War, i8<)9-
19)9. «d B.|.C McKercher (Westport. CT, t992>. 149-71 • 
120 DCER.HI 17* 
121 Quoted in B.J.C McKercher. 'Between Two Giants: Canada, the Coolidge 
Conference, and Anglo-American Relations in 1927,' in Anglo-American 
Relation*- m the 19X»: The Struggle (or Supremacy, ed. idem (Edmonton, Lon­
don. 1990). 91. 
>Z2 How memorandum, TO |uly 1926. Mackenzie King Papers, vol. 124, file 913. 
12} See Stephen Harris. Canadian Brass The Making of a Professkinal Army, 1860-
19}9 (Toronto. 1988), 169-78. 
